The Effects of Confirmation Bias and Susceptibility to Deception on an Individual’s Choice to Share Information by Chinzi, Ashley (Author) et al.
The Effects of Confirmation Bias and Susceptibility to Deception on an Individual’s 
Choice to Share Information  
by 
Ashley Chinzi 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Science  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2019 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Nancy Cooke, Chair 
Erin Chiou 
David Vaughn Becker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
May 2019  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
As deception in cyberspace becomes more dynamic, research in this area should 
also take a dynamic approach to battling deception and false information. Research has 
previously shown that people are no better than chance at detecting deception. Deceptive 
information in cyberspace, specifically on social media, is not exempt from this pitfall. 
Current practices in social media rely on the users to detect false information and use 
appropriate discretion when deciding to share information online. This is ineffective and 
will predicatively end with users being unable to discern true from false information at 
all, as deceptive information becomes more difficult to distinguish from true information. 
To proactively combat inaccurate and deceptive information on social media, research 
must be conducted to understand not only the interaction effects of false content and user 
characteristics, but user behavior that stems from this interaction as well. This study 
investigated the effects of confirmation bias and susceptibility to deception on an 
individual’s choice to share information, specifically to understand how these factors 
relate to the sharing of false controversial information.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Photos of sharks swimming in the streets of New York and a hurricane 
majestically floating over the statue of liberty went viral on Twitter when hurricane 
Sandy raged through New York and New Jersey in October of 2012. These ridiculous 
stories and photos opened the door for more realistic yet still entirely false information, 
like the flooding of the New York Stock Exchange, to proliferate across even more social 
media platforms. Forbes online magazine writer, Kashmir Hill, notes that one particular 
Twitter account produced a slew of both true and false information regarding the 
hurricane’s effects, and subsequently has been identified and socially punished for 
propagating false information (Hill, 2012). The spread of false information on social 
media has become a large issue affecting research, economics, politics, and numerous 
other platforms. Deceptive information, like that stemming from the events of hurricane 
Sandy, multiplies at a furious rate on social media; and deception grows even more 
strategic as technology changes and social media becomes a main source of news for 
many of its users (Shearer & Gottfried, 2017).  
 Social media presents an excellent opportunity for deception in cyber space, as it 
sees the most web traffic and has low social costs associated with sharing and posting 
information, compared to direct news sites and other validated, reputable sources (Allcott 
& Gentzkow, 2017). Cyber criminals can reach thousands of potential victims through 
social media. For example, a common scam, named “like-farming,” uses a fake social 
media profile to share a post offering a free prize if individuals like and share the post. 
This ensures that the page receives thousands of likes and therefore increases the page’s 
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market value and potential to endorse other false campaigns and information (Abel, 
2017). In the context of a bogus product, this deception seems ludicrous at best. 
However, put into the context of important information, like the Presidential Election or 
gun control policy, deception in this form takes on a whole new, dangerous precedent.  
Although the source of deceptive content online introduces the deception, that 
source is not necessarily responsible for the dissemination of deceptive information. The 
source relies on the online sharing behavior of their victims; much like in the previous 
“like-farming” example, those who produce the content rely on the sharing, commenting, 
and liking behavior of users who see the information. Even if those users do not intend to 
spread false information, those individuals perpetuate the issue to an even higher level. 
Therefore, the behavior of those who share deceptive information should be evaluated 
alongside the behavior of those who produce deceptive information. Current research 
assumes that users can and will (in theory) effectively question the credibility of 
information on social media, and that this has the potential to decrease the spread of false 
information (Metzger, Flanagin, & Medders, 2010). However, humans are subject to 
biases and heuristics that govern and ease the otherwise complex process of digesting 
information. Part of the process of digesting information includes the ability to discern 
false information from truthful information, which is also affected by these biases and 
heuristics (Metzger, & Flanagin, 2013). Therefore, it is important that research aimed at 
remedying this issue considers the biases of users in terms of deception detection, as well 
as social media users’ susceptibility to deception, and the roles they play in the user’s 
actions following the consumption of false information. This study aims to uncover the 
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roles confirmation bias and susceptibility to deception play in a user’s choice to share 
information on social media.   
Research in this area has yet to focus on how confirmation bias affects a user’s 
choice to share false information, instead focusing on the effects that exist if users simply 
believe the information they consume (like a polarized public opinion in politics resulting 
from belief in false information consumed and believed about one political party). 
Believing the information and choosing to disseminate the information are two separate 
issues, each with their own consequences. However, the two are not mutually exclusive. 
People may be more likely to share information that they believe and deem credible. The 
existing research has observed this issue from two perspectives. The first aims to aid 
users in discerning, detecting and preventing deceptive information that has already gone 
viral in cyberspace (Driskell, 2012). The second, which reflects more recent research, has 
focused on what factors make users more susceptible to false information online 
(Williams et al. 2017). Both approaches to preventing deception on social media have a 
few issues. First, there is no evidence that social media users regularly use the tools 
currently available to them (e.g., Politifact.com, Snopes.com) for fact-checking or 
detecting deception, so introducing new ways to aid this effort may be misguided. 
Secondly, little research has evaluated the behavior of users who are considered victims 
of online deception and how their characteristics and beliefs may affect that behavior. 
Specifically, the sharing behavior of those online users has yet to be thoroughly evaluated 
as it relates to their susceptibility to deception and confirmation bias. Research in this 
area has instead focused on what personal characteristics, sources, and type of 
information make people more susceptible, but not necessarily how that susceptibility 
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affects an individual’s decision to share information they see online (Clayton, Davis, 
Hinckley, & Horiuchi, 2017).  
Confirmation bias is known to contribute to an individual’s susceptibility to false 
information (Williams et. al, 2017); but research has not explicitly looked at the effects of 
that susceptibility on the users’ choice to share deceptive information on social media. 
The current study aims to answer the question: How does confirmation bias and 
susceptibility to deception affect a user’s choice to share false information on social 
media? The findings from this study will contribute to measures taken to mitigate false 
information online and prevent the spread of false information on social media.  
Susceptibility to Deception 
Questions about how to directly and effectively mitigate the spread of false 
information on social media remains to be answered. A multitude of research has studied 
different algorithms and theories applied to cues and motivations associated with both the 
false information online and the sources that share the information. On its own, deception 
has been studied in a plethora of domains targeting both the behavior of deceivers as well 
as the behavior of the deceived. Rarely does research put the deceived in the role of the 
deceiver (albeit, an unintentional deceiver); that is, the deceived as the direct perpetuator 
of the deception, even though deception is characterized by the conscious, premeditated 
manipulation of another’s behavior (Bodmer, 2012). Understanding how users’ 
susceptibility to deception affects their sharing behavior and considering susceptible 
users as active deceivers in the context of sharing false information, may answer 
questions about how to prevent users from disseminating false information online.  
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Behavior of the deceiver. Much of research surrounding deceiver behavior is 
focused on identifying motives and characteristics of deceivers and their deception, 
assuming that these are consciously decided, and that the deceiver’s behavior is fully 
intentional. Caspi and Gorsky (2006) aimed to discover motivations of those who 
indicate having engaged in online deception, and to investigate emotions associated with 
online deception.  Using a web-based questionnaire, the study uncovered that 29% of 
respondents had deceived online. They also uncovered that more than 20% of 
respondents lied about personal characteristics like sex, age, residence, marital status, or 
occupation. Respondents who reported engaging in deception online indicated privacy 
concerns and identity play as common motivations for deception. A study by Abbasi and 
Liu (2013) considered the source of the information and aimed to identify the credibility 
of the source of information. They considered the coordination of users (those in a clique 
or highly connected) to hold less credibility, as these users have a high level of support 
and can share each other’s content, deter sharing from other less coordinated users, and 
therefore spread information widely and efficiently (i.e., imagine a band of Twitter 
accounts aimed at spreading a false narrative about the President’s golf game). The 
authors presented the CredRank algorithm, which can monitor and analyze the behavior 
of social media users, and identify collective, coordinated behavior from similarities in 
behavior between the users. The algorithm clusters coordinated users together and then 
assigns a credibility weight to each cluster, with lower credibility weights assigned to 
highly coordinated users.  
Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) explored the economic effects of fake news in social 
media in the context of the 2016 United States Presidential election. The study measured 
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the number of fake news stories each participant read and remembered of 15 news stories 
(randomly selected from 30 fake news stories) that circulated during the 2016 election to 
gauge the level of exposure to fake news. They found that the US adult on average read 
and remembered at least one fake news story. The study also looked at the social costs 
associated with using social media and found that consumers who believe the content of a 
fake news outlet may hold inaccurate beliefs and become more doubtful of information 
on real news outlets. They also found a potential reduction in incentive for news outlets 
to invest in accurate reporting. Fake news may reinforce confirmation bias, as people 
become more skeptical of the real news reported by credible sources and instead turn to 
less reputable sources like social media to find information that may confirm their 
preconceived beliefs.  
Reinforcement of confirmation bias could possibly be a factor that encourages 
those individuals who believe the false information to then share the false information.  
The idea that consumers who believe fake news might disregard the truthful information 
put out by credible news sources may facilitate the role confirmation bias plays in the 
information consumed and disseminated by users on social media platforms. Therefore, 
further investigation of the effects of confirmation bias on a user’s choice to share false 
information may inform research about ways to counter confirmation bias and prevent 
users from spreading deceptive information.  
Behavior and beliefs of the deceived. Taber and Lodge (2006) investigated 
people’s inability to fairly criticize arguments due to prior beliefs, and confirmation and 
disconfirmation bias. They evaluated how participants rated strength of political 
arguments that either aligned with their beliefs or did not, in the context of affirmative 
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action and gun control policy. They evaluated these ratings while also considering 
strength of political affiliation (strength of attitude), political competency 
(sophistication), and congruence of arguments to participant’s political beliefs. Using two 
experiments, the study evaluated a prior attitude effect, disconfirmation bias, 
confirmation bias, attitude polarization, an attitude strength affect, and a sophistication 
effect. The first experiment required participants to evaluate political issues, some of 
which were used to measure strength of attitude and attitude position on either 
affirmative action or gun control. Participants were then asked to view information from 
8 policy arguments provided from a matrix of 16 policy arguments with a labeled source 
(Republican party, NRA, Democratic Party, Citizens Against Handguns), followed by 
demographic questions. This task tested for confirmation bias by allowing participants to 
view 8 policy arguments of their own choosing. The participants were then asked to 
evaluate the political issues again to measure any change in attitude. The second 
experiment mimicked the first, except participants were also asked to give their thoughts 
on two pro and two con policy arguments for either issue (affirmative action or gun 
control policy). They found that those who advocated for the issue chose to view 
information from the source that primarily aligned with their beliefs. This study 
demonstrates how confirmation bias affects the information people choose to view and 
provides a strong argument for the notion that confirmation bias affects a person’s 
perception of deceptive information; what this effect does to the person’s decision to 
disseminate the information remains unanswered.   
Clayton, Davis, Hinckley, and Horiuchi (2017) evaluated if people would rate a 
vague, false statement from an article as accurate and if they would want to read more of 
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the article if that article were from a source that aligned with the person’s ideologies. 
They found that participants exposed to a false statement often judged them as accurate, 
and that exposure to the false statement increased the participants’ interest in reading 
more of the article regardless of political beliefs or source of news. This led to the 
conclusion that content does play a larger role than source cues in predicting if 
participants will believe the false statement. Similarly, Pennycook, Cannon, and Rand 
(2017) found that knowledge of the source of news did not affect how people perceive 
truth of the false information.  
 Williams, Beardmore, and Joinson (2017) presented a theoretical review of 
factors identified in the literature that influence susceptibility in relation to responding to 
online scams, and presented a holistic model for assessing individuals’ susceptibility to 
online scamming and influence. They discuss self-awareness, self-control, trust, self-
deception, motivation, expertise, and other types of individual characteristics that 
previous research has studied regarding susceptibility. They also highlight four levels that 
are likely to affect individual susceptibility for their model: individual traits of the 
recipient of the scam, the current state of the recipient (current mood, fatigue, etc.), the 
context which the individual is in currently (work, home, etc.), and the type of online 
influence used (time pressure, appealing to emotion, etc.). This review sheds light on 
individual characteristics that have been shown to increase a person’s susceptibility of 
engaging with online scams and can be extended to those who consume and disseminate 
information on social media.  
Dissonance theory. Deception relies on the concrete, consistent, and unyielding 
beliefs and behaviors of target individuals, and those with the most unyielding beliefs and 
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behaviors tend to be the most susceptible to deception, as these are the individuals that 
deceivers tend to manipulate for gain (Bodmer, 2012). Therefore, understanding the 
strength of individuals’ beliefs and their sharing behavior in terms of information online 
will allow research to investigate more direct associations between the strength of beliefs 
and sharing behavior. 
Similar to the concept that there is consistency between a person’s attitudes and 
their beliefs, there generally is also consistency between a person’s beliefs and their 
behavior (Festinger, 1962). Cognitive dissonance theory in relation to behavior stems 
from this basic principle: people act in accordance with what they believe. Festinger 
(1957) observed the behavior of individuals involved in a cult, which believed that a 
great flood would destroy the earth and only the most faithful cult members would 
survive. When no flood came, the most devoted cult members maintained a stronghold on 
their beliefs in the face of clear, contradictory evidence, as they tried to justify their 
behavior and rationalize their beliefs rather than accept that their beliefs were misguided 
and change them. Instead, they looked for information that aligned with their beliefs and 
that would also explain why the flood did not occur, even if that evidence did not possess 
the same credibility as the contradictory evidence. They rationalized in order to lessen the 
cognitive dissonance between their beliefs, actions, and the existing evidence, and ended 
up spreading information about how their devotion had saved the world (Festinger, 
Riecken, Schachter, 1956).  
 Like many people, social media users also hold beliefs and opinions that may be 
strongly contradicted by existing evidence. When exposed to information on social media 
that contradicts those beliefs, people will either choose not to believe the information, 
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rationalize an explanation in favor of their existing beliefs, or search for confirmatory 
evidence of their beliefs. Although people may not necessarily shy away from the 
possibility of contacting conflicting points of view, their beliefs and the presence of 
contradictory information may still influence what they choose to believe; and 
consequently, what they share on social media (Garrett, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick, 
Meng, 2009). What people believe and what they are presented may cause cognitive 
dissonance and have bearing on their behavior; the effects of which may be the sharing of 
false information. The proposed study aims to uncover the behavior that follows the 
consumption of information in the presence of deceptive information and confirmation 
bias tendencies.  
Confirmation Bias 
 Peter Wason (1960) coined the term confirmation bias when he discovered that 
most people solely seek confirmatory evidence, instead of both confirmatory and 
disconfirming evidence, to make inferences about an abstract conceptual task. In 
Wason’s original study, participants were presented with a set of three numbers (2, 4, 6) 
and asked to discover the rule associated with this sequence of numbers by creating other 
sets of 3 numbers that conform to the same rule. Participants were told when their 
numbers conformed to the rule. When participants thought they knew the rule, they 
would write it down and were told whether or not the rule was correct. If the rule was 
incorrect, the participants would continue creating number sequences and announcing 
rules until they announced the correct rule, or until the session ended. Only 6 out of 29 
participants announced the correct rule the first time after initially eliminating a 
significant amount more of possibilities than those who did not give the correct rule the 
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first time. In Wason’s famous selection task (1968), participants were asked to make 
inferences about an “if P, then Q” statement from a set of four cards. Provided with the 
conditional statement “If there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even 
number on the other side”, and four cards which showed a vowel or consonant and two 
which showed an even or odd number, participants were asked to choose which cards 
they would need to turn over in order to prove the statement true or false. Most 
participants selected the card with a vowel, between 60 and 75 percent of participants 
selected the card with an even number, a small number of participants selected the card 
with an odd number, and barely any participants selected the card with a consonant letter 
(Wason, 1968).  
The correct answer is to turn over the vowel card and the odd number card. If one 
turns over the vowel and there is not an even number on the other side, then this 
disproves the statement. If the number is even, then this proves the statement. If one turns 
over the odd numbered card and there is a consonant on the other side, then this also 
proves the statement. If the other side of the odd number card reveals a vowel, then this 
disproves the statement. If a vowel and an odd number occur on the same card, then the 
conditional statement is false (Wason & Shapiro, 1972). The most common option 
chosen, the vowel card and the even number card, do not satisfy the conditions of the 
statement; for example, the statement never specifies that an even card would always 
have a vowel on the other side. Therefore, turning over this card would neither prove nor 
disprove the statement. Less than 10% of people chose the correct cards, indicating that 
when individuals engage in reasoning tasks they rely on confirmatory biases (Wason, 
1968; Evans, 1982). 
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Other studies have also experimented with the selection task, varying it in content 
with thematic material like drinking ages and transportation. Studies like Griggs (1989) 
addressed the low success rate in the original experiment by introducing the idea that the 
original task was too abstract in content. For example, changing the task to include social 
constructs, instead of arbitrary numbers and colors, increases the percentage of people 
who are successful in the task (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972). Results from 
these studies challenge the results from Wason’s original study, as they show higher task 
success rates (Griggs, 1989; Nickerson, Butler, & Barch, 2017). Speculation has also 
surrounded the notion that the vowel and the even number cards in the original 
experiment may be the most selected options because they are a part of the rule stated, or 
because they are the most relevant options for the task (Margolis, 1987; Evans, 1984). 
Wason and Shapiro (1971) presented the task in both an abstract and thematic form and 
found that success increased on the thematic representation of the task. They outline three 
theories to explain this jump in task success rates, citing the concrete nature of the 
thematic content. This study will implement a selection task modeled from Wason and 
Shapiro (1971).  
Confirmation bias is commonly known as a reasoning or inferential error that 
biases an individual’s search and acceptance of information related to a preconceived 
belief (Evans, 1989). The concept has been studied as it applies to decision making in 
multiple areas including medical, group, and financial decision-making among other 
domains. Confirmation bias has also been referred to as selective exposure and congenial 
bias, among other terms, in previous studies (Hart, Albarracín, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, 
& Merrill, 2009). Selective exposure, congenial bias, and confirmation bias all involve 
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the tendency to consume more information that aligns with pre-existing views while 
avoiding information that contradicts those pre-existing views (Dylko, Dolgov, Hoffman, 
Eckhart, Molina, & Aaziz, 2017). Studies like Taber and Lodge (2006) and Stroud (2008) 
demonstrate selective exposure through their evaluation of attitude polarization within a 
political context, and media types more likely to inspire selective exposure. Research in 
this area focuses on the consumption of information; namely the amount of biased 
information and the context of the information that people seek. Little research concerns 
how this consumption affects the sharing of information. As stated previously, believing 
and consuming information are separate but related actions to sharing information.  
The concept has not been explicitly studied as it applies to the decision-making 
that goes into sharing information on social media. This has become a hot issue, affecting 
political decision-making, perception of news outlets and other sources found online, the 
public image of reputable political figures, celebrities, local law enforcements, and even 
personal relationships among users. This issue continues to grow as social media has 
become a major part of information consumption and dissemination; therefore, promoting 
research on confirmation bias as it applies to this area will prove beneficial for efforts 
aimed at improving information sharing on social media.  
Sharing Behavior 
 Little research has focused on what facilitates information sharing on social 
media. Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2014) examined the relationship between sentimental 
social media content and information sharing behavior. Comparing neutral and 
emotionally charged Twitter posts, they found that emotionally charged posts were 
shared much more often than those containing neutral content. Yu, Lu, and Liu (2010) 
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explored information sharing, and the factors that promote and encourage individuals to 
share knowledge. They found that perceived openness and fairness within online 
communities encouraged people to share knowledge within that online community. 
Acquisti and Gross (2006) evaluated factors that motivate Facebook users to share 
personal information, even when those users express general concerns about privacy. 
They found that users were more concerned with access to the information vs. the 
information itself, and that “having fun” and providing relevant and necessary 
information for themselves and others on Facebook were highly motivating factors to 
share information on Facebook. Stemming from Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2014), the 
current study aimed to evaluate sharing behavior, in the presence of controversial content 
that may elicit confirmation bias tendencies, to evaluate whether confirmation bias affects 
the choice to share information. The current study also sought to evaluate users’ 
susceptibility to deception, and the role it plays in this decision as well.  
Confirmation bias has been studied in a plethora of contexts and situations. 
However, it has not been directly applied to a user’s choice to share false information on 
social media platforms. The literature on this subject is rich with cues that indicate 
deception (Zhou, Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003; Briscoe, Appling, & Hayes, 2014), 
people’s natural and trained ability to detect deception (Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, 
Tickle, & Green, 1999; Driskell, 2012), deceiver profile types (Seebruck, 2015), and the 
subsequent effects of deception on social media (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Previous 
research that focused on increasing the accuracy of detecting lies and deception, both in 
face-to-face and online platforms, guided research toward developing ways to enhance 
people’s ability to detect deception in cyberspace; but much of research has not studied 
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the effects of confirmation bias and susceptibility to deception on that ability and the 
actions that follow.  
Social Media 
Social media has allowed small pieces of information to flourish beyond fully-
fledged articles and other lengthy pieces of information that generally give more context 
and information on a subject. These small pieces of information hold almost the same 
value as a full article in the sense that people are willing to believe and digest the 
information as if it came from a traditional and reputable news source. Therefore, this 
study aimed to capture the effects of confirmation bias and susceptibility to deception on 
sharing behavior using small pieces of information, rather than full articles and news 
posts, to better mimic the social media environment. Users may be more likely to 
encounter false information from an easily consumed, short piece of information rather 
than a long article. Pempek, Yermolayeva, & Calvert (2009) found that users of social 
media spend more time consuming information than sharing information. Because shorter 
pieces of textual information generally require less time to attend to than traditionally 
long pieces of information, social media users may be more likely to attend to shorter 
pieces and fully digest the information presented. These conjectures, as well as the 
current state of common social media platforms, contributed to the context and formation 
of content used in this study. 
 Without understanding the effects of confirmation bias and susceptibility to 
deception on a user’s choice to share information, one cannot efficiently equip users to 
accurately detect deception on social media. As previous research has demonstrated that 
individuals’ political views influence their attention to information (Garrett, 2009) — and 
  16 
that people typically choose to read more and spend more time on attitude-consistent 
content (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009) — this study hypothesized that those 
considered highly susceptible to deception, and prone to confirmation bias, would have a 
higher rate of false confirmatory posts shared than those with a low level of susceptibility 
to deception. This hypothesis is based on the idea that those who are prone to 
confirmation bias may typically choose to view information related to their views on 
controversial topics; and that those considered highly susceptible to deception may be 
more likely to believe false information; both which in turn may influence sharing 
behavior. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS 
Design  
This study utilized a within-subjects experimental design with content (true vs. 
false) posts shared (controversial vs. neutral) as factors, and susceptibility to deception 
and confirmation bias as covariates. All participants partook in a Wason Selection Task 
to determine the inclination to succumb to confirmation bias. Participants then played a 
modified version of Battleship, a game developed for ARO MURI Cyber Inception 
project, which emphasizes the use of deception to win. Measures taken from the modified 
version of Battleship were used to assess a rate of susceptibility to deception. All 
participants were then asked to read through 20 small pieces of information, of both 
neutral and controversial content that mimic social media posts, and indicate which posts 
they would share. A post-test questionnaire was used to gather information concerning 
participants’ agreement (agree vs. degree) on 10 pre-selected controversial topics present 
on social media in the last 6 months. The controversial content among the 20 posts was 
based on 5 of these 10 pre-selected topics.  
Participants 
Thirty participants were recruited for this study. Participants were consenting 
adults between the ages of 18 and 55, were fluent in the English language, had at least 
average or average to corrected vision, and were familiar with social media platforms. 
Participants were from all types of backgrounds including differences in industry, 
education, income level, and technological aptitude. Participants were recruited via the 
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ASU SONA System, fliers put up around ASU Polytechnic and Tempe campuses, and 
through word of mouth.  
Procedure 
 Verbal consent was obtained from each participant. Each participant was assigned 
an arbitrary number (ex: participant 1, participant 2, etc.) to ensure that personal 
information, stances on controversial issues, and characteristics cannot be traced back to 
specific participants. After having obtained participant consent, each participant partook 
in the Wason Selection task. Participants then played the modified version of Battleship, 
from which measures were taken to determine their level of susceptibility to deception. 
Participants were then presented with 20 different posts. Participants viewed each of the 
20 posts and indicated if they would share the information by clicking the available share 
button, or by clicking “next” if they did not wish to share the post. Participants were able 
to click “previous” to go back and view any of the posts. Ten of the posts contained 
considerably neutral information (non-controversial information), while the remaining 
ten contained information related to 5 controversial topics that have been consistently 
present on social media for at least the last 6 months. The information in each post was 
made up of either completely false or completely true information. There were no posts 
with a mixture of false and true information. After indicating which posts they would 
share, participants were given a questionnaire which asked about their views on 10 
controversial topics, 5 of which were used for topics in the controversial posts. 
Controversial topics include gun control policy, the millennial generation, healthcare, 
immigration policies, technology, minimum wage, abortion, sexual assault investigations, 
U.S. intervention into world politics, and nuclear power. After completing all phases of 
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the experiment (Selection task, Battleship, post sharing, questionnaire) participants were 
debriefed to establish that not all of the posts they viewed were real, and that they should 
not believe any of the information they were presented without looking into the 
information on their own.  
Materials 
 Wason Selection Task. All participants participated in a context-based, Wason 
selection task to determine confirmation bias. The current study utilized a selection task 
comprised of “thematic” content. Participants were presented with 4 cards on a 
touchscreen tablet, 2 labeled with a city name (Chicago and New Orleans) and the other 
two labeled with a transportation type (taxi and bus), as shown in Figure 1. They were 
instructed to select cards that they think would need to be turned over to falsify the 
statement: “If I am traveling to New Orleans, I am traveling by bus.” Participants who 
turned over the “New Orleans” and “taxi” cards successfully tested the conditional rule. 
Those who turn over New Orleans and taxi, or just New Orleans, will be considered less 
prone to confirmation bias (0), and those who turn over the bus will be considered the 
most prone to confirmation bias (1) as the New Orleans and bus cards indicate a person’s 
propensity to search for confirmatory evidence only; and choosing “bus” is committing a 
logical error.  
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Fig 1. Wason Selection task interface  
Modified Battleship board game. A modified version of the traditional 
Battleship has been created as a part of the ARO MURI Cyber Inception project to 
understand deceptive cues and behaviors. This game was used in this study to measure 
susceptibility to deception. This version of Battleship allows players to deceive their 
opponents by lying about “hits” and “misses.” For example, if one player calls out the 
position A4 and it is a “hit”, their opponent may lie and say that it was a “miss.” Players 
may call out their opponent’s bluff and will earn an extra shot for themselves and lose a 
shot for their opponent on the next turn if the bluff is correctly uncovered. If the player 
calls out a shot as a bluff that is actually truthful, then they lose a shot for themselves and 
gain a shot for their opponent on the next turn. Each player keeps track of “hits” and 
“misses” just like in the original Battleship. This is demonstrated in Figure 2. By the end 
of the game, bluffs left uncovered will be considered bluffs believed. The susceptibility 
of a player will be based on how many bluffs he believes compared to the total number of 
bluffs by the end of the game. For example, if there are 5 uncovered bluffs out of 15 
bluffs total throughout the game, then the player’s susceptibility to deception will be 
5/15. For simplicity this also means, for example, that those who believe 1 of 2 bluffs 
will be considered as susceptible as someone who believes 10 of 20 bluffs. This may 
present a limitation to the measure. Both players’ game boards were photographed and 
documented to identify bluffs believed and bluffs questioned, as shown in Figure 2. For 
example, if a player has put a white peg (indicating a “miss”) where on his opponent’s 
board is actually a hit, that will be considered a believed bluff. This ratio will be used as a 
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measure of susceptibility. The less bluffs a player believes compared to the total amount 
bluffs, the less they are considered susceptible to deception.  
 
Fig 2. Battleship Game playing boards 
In the real world, the more lies believed means a lower rate of detected deception, 
and this may indicate higher susceptibility to deception. Within the context of this game, 
the more lies believed means less consistency between players’ boards, which indicates 
the more likely players are to believe lies. The full rules and guidelines for this modified 
version of the Battleship game are available in Appendix A. Although these measures 
gauge susceptibility to deception within a direct interactive context, they may still inform 
susceptibility to deception in an indirect interaction (communicating through sharing 
information online). Battleship does not require social interaction beyond verbally calling 
out shots; it instead requires players to carefully observe their opponent’s actions. This 
mimics a social media environment where one can observe the actions of others but not 
observe nonverbal cues associated with those actions.  
Post content. Participants were presented with a Google Slides presentation of 20 
mock social media posts of either false or true information on a touch screen tablet, as 
depicted in Figure 3 below.  
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Fig 3. Social Media posts presentation interface  
Each participant was exposed to an equal combination of these true and false 
posts; that is, 10 posts were true and 10 were false. The content of these posts is modeled 
from similar information currently found online, but does not adopt a similarity that 
threatens a history effect. The content was created using common topics highlighted on 
social media to prevent participants from choosing to share information based on 
previous knowledge of posts likely seen on social media. Ten posts contained 
controversial topic information found on social media in the last six months; these topics 
include advances in technology, immigration policy, gun control policy, healthcare, and 
characteristics of the millennial generation. These topics were selected based on the 
selection of topics in previous research (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Topics were also selected 
from a variety of areas to avoid agreement or disagreement with all topics presented (ex: 
someone who may agree with gun control policy may disagree on advances in 
technology). These topics were chosen from a variety of controversial issues specifically, 
which are topics known to likely elicit public disagreement. The other ten posts contained 
information on more neutral topics such as health suggestions, fitness information, online 
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products and businesses, charities, and pets/animals, topics that do not elicit the same 
public disagreement as the controversial topics. The presentation order of posts for each 
participant was random to control for order effects, and each of the ten topics (5 neutral, 5 
controversial) was equally represented. Content for both topics is available in Appendix 
B.  
Post-test questionnaire. The post-test questionnaire was used to determine the 
participants’ stance on 10 controversial topics to measure for congruence of beliefs to 
content shared. All participants were asked to complete this questionnaire. Cross-
referencing these measures with the amount of false information posts and truthful 
information posts shared by the participants, and their level of susceptibility to deception, 
was intended to reveal the role of both on sharing behavior. Post-test questions are 
available in Appendix C.  
Pilot Data. The social media posts and Wason Selection task were piloted to 
evaluate differences in sharing behavior and confirmation bias susceptibility. Five 
individuals voluntarily participated in the pilot. All participants indicated a proneness for 
confirmation bias, as no participants selected the “New Orleans” and “taxi” card 
combination. An array of sharing behavior was observed, as 1 participant shared a false 
confirmatory post, 4 participants shared one or more true confirmatory posts, 4 
participants shared one or more false neutral posts, and 3 participants shared two or more 
true neutral posts, as shown in Table 1 below. The pilot data demonstrated a variety of 
sharing behavior, and consistency of susceptibility to confirmation bias.  
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Table 1. 
Pilot Data for Sharing Behavior of True (T) and False (F) Content 
 
Participant Wason 
Selections 
Controversial 
(F)  
Controversial 
(T) 
Neutral (F) Neutral 
(T) 
1 Chicago; taxi 0 2 0 2 
2 Chicago; bus 1 1 1 3 
3 New Orleans; 
Chicago; bus 
0 1 2 3 
4 New Orleans; 
bus 
0 0 1 0 
5 bus 0 2 1 0 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 Twenty-two of the 30 participants selected the “bus” card in the thematic Wason 
Selection Task, indicating their proneness to confirmation bias (M = 0.76, SD = 0.45). 
Participants also demonstrated a variety of rates of susceptibility to deception (M = 0.51, 
SD = 0.29), with exactly half (N =15) demonstrating a rate below 50% and the other half 
(N = 15) demonstrating a rate above 50%. Means of both measures are represented in 
Figure 4 below. Sharing behavior also varied, as seen in the pilot study, with participants 
sharing a variety of controversial, neutral, true, and false posts. Further analysis is 
discussed below. 
 
Fig. 4 The mean proportion of times participants were deceived (susceptibility to deception) and the mean 
of participants’ proneness to confirmation bias (coded as either 1 or 0 for each participant).  
This study hypothesized that those considered highly susceptible to deception, 
and those prone to confirmation bias, would be more likely to share posts with false 
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information about controversial topics. A Pearson correlation was conducted to evaluate 
the relationship between rate of susceptibility to deception and total number of false 
controversial posts shared. There was no correlation between rate of susceptibility to 
deception and total number of false controversial posts shared (r = -.073, n = 30,  p = 
.703. Figures 5 summarizes these results.  
 
Fig. 5 Relationship between rate of susceptibility to deception and total number of false controversial posts 
shared 
A chi-square analysis was used to determine if there was a relationship between 
proneness to confirmation bias and total number of false controversial posts shared. For 
this analysis, participants were either less (0) or more (1) prone to confirmation bias, and 
sharing was categorized based on the number of posts shared. Those who shared 2 or less 
false controversial posts were considered “low sharers” while those who shared 3 or more 
posts were considered “high sharers”. The maximum number of false controversial posts 
that each participant could share was 5. The chi-square analysis revealed no significant 
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relationship between confirmation bias and the number (low vs. high) of posts shared (1, 
N = 30) = 1.591, p = .207. 
As past studies have evaluated the information people choose to view while 
considering the strength of their agreement on a controversial topic, or the congruence of 
the content to their beliefs, this study also evaluated the relationship between the strength 
of agreement on the 5 controversial issues and the sharing of false controversial posts. A 
Pearson correlation demonstrated no statistically significant relationship between total 
false controversial posts shared and strength of agreement on gun control (r = -.288, p = 
.122), the millennial generation (r = .051, n = 30, p = .791), healthcare (r = -.042, n = 30, 
p = .827), immigration (r = .054, n = 30, p = .776), or advances in technology (r = -.090, 
n = 30, p = .634).  
Figures 6 and 7 below show how many times each post associated with each of 
the controversial issues was shared compared to agreement and disagreement on the 
controversial issue. Important to note is that the posts were written in a way that they 
might appeal to either those who agree or disagree with the controversial topic. For 
example, the conceal carry post read as: “Conceal carry permit owners may choose in 
which states to carry their weapon.” This may appeal to those who agree with gun 
control, as the post is something they would want to share as a means for promoting gun 
control policy for increased safety. It may also appeal to those who are against gun 
control, as the post is something they would want to share as a means of highlighting the 
value of less gun control policy. 
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Fig. 6 Posts related to controversial issues shared compared to agreement on related issue 
 
Fig. 7 Posts related to controversial issues shared compared to disagreement on related issue 
Although the current study was most interested in false controversial posts shared, 
the sharing of other posts was also considered in reference to past research. Figure 8 
shows, overall, how many false controversial posts, true controversial posts, false neutral 
posts, and true neutral posts were shared across all participants, along with the total 
number of posts shared overall. This shows that more true neutral posts were shared 
overall, and that more false controversial than false neutral posts were shared, and that 
more true neutral posts than true controversial posts were shared. A one-way ANOVA 
was conducted to understand if there was a significant difference between types of posts 
(false controversial, true controversial, false neutral, true neutral) on the number of posts 
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shared. The ANOVA revealed no significant effect of the type of post on the number of 
posts shared, F(3, 116) = 1.613, p = .19. Figure 9 depicts the mean number of times each 
type of post was shared. 
 
Fig. 8 Number of true and false, controversial (C) and neutral (N), posts shared overall 
 
Fig. 9 There were 5 of each type of post: false controversial (FC), true controversial (TC), false neutral 
(FN), and true neutral (TN). The figure shows the mean number of times each type of post was shared. 
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Reasons for Sharing 
Participants were asked why they shared the information that they did in this 
study. Reasons have been coded from open-ended responses, shown in Figure 10 below. 
Most participants shared information in this study because it was interesting, or they 
agreed with the information. This suggests that confirmation bias may play a role, 
although not a largely significant one, in the type of information participants shared.  
 
Fig. 10 Coded reasons for sharing  
Frequency and content shared. Participants were asked to indicate how often 
they share information on social media, as well as what type of information they share. 
Figure 11 shows participants’ self-report measure of how often they share on social 
media, and Figure 12 shows the types of posts participants indicate they typically share 
on social media. A majority of participants indicate that they share on social media daily, 
and they typically share posts from friends, personal photos, and posts from family.  
Considering the reasons people shared information in this study, how often they 
typically share information on social media, and what information they typically share 
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suggests that 1) people share information that is interesting to them or aligns with their 
beliefs and 2) that they share information from someone they trust, like a family member 
or friend. Therefore, they may be likely to share information that aligns with their beliefs 
or is interesting if it comes from a friend or family member, regardless of whether the 
content may be true or false.  
 
Fig. 11 Frequency of sharing 
 
Fig 12 Types of content shared 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 The current study sought to understand the effects of susceptibility to deception 
and confirmation bias on the information that people choose to share within a social 
media platform. Specifically, the study examined how these factors relate to the amount 
of false controversial posts participants shared. There was no statistically significant 
relationship found between the total number of false controversial posts shared and 
susceptibility to deception or confirmation bias, which may suggest that if these factors 
do play a role in the choice to share information on social media, it may be a small role.  
Overall, participants shared more false controversial posts than false neutral posts, 
and more true neutral posts than true controversial posts. This may have something to do 
with participants’ comfort and perceived level of knowledge with the topics. For 
example, a participant may be more comfortable and consider themselves more 
knowledgeable about health and fitness rather than healthcare, which may lead them to 
share more true information about health and fitness and less true information about 
healthcare. This could be investigated in the future by asking about their perceived level 
of knowledge and comfort in the topics presented and comparing it to the information 
they choose to share.  
Limitations 
As this study aimed to understand the sharing behavior that follows exposure to 
deceptive information, limitations are acknowledged. These include the assumption of 
confirmation bias and susceptibility to deception as large factors, the susceptibility to 
deception measure taken within the context of a larger project, and the differences that 
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exist between social media users. First, this study assumes that confirmation bias and 
susceptibility play a larger role when other larger factors, such as accountability or trust, 
may be at play as well. However, this study does contribute to understanding the role of 
these factors in the face of entirely deceptive information and with the opportunity to 
share that information.  
The measure for susceptibility to deception was taken in the context of a larger 
project; the ARO MURI Cyber Inception grant project, specifically. The context of the 
Cyber Inception project aims to investigate a deceiver’s behavior and strategies, and an 
individual’s tendency to believe the deceiver’s lies in a game environment. Taking this 
measure from this context may not have accurately represented a person’s true 
susceptibility. There may be other factors involved including attributes like propensity for 
risk, self-awareness, and perception of online credibility among other factors. Participants 
were also exposed to different amounts of deception in this study. Although this may be 
more realistically representative of real-world exposure, it may have affected the results 
of this study. In future work, this could be controlled by limiting the number of times a 
person deceives or requiring them to deceive a specific number of times in order to keep 
exposure to deception equal across all participants. This may also allow levels of 
susceptibility to be categorized as numerically high or low. This, of course, comes with 
its own limitations as people are not generally restricted in the amount of lies they can 
tell.  
 Although not investigated here, the difference between different types of social 
media users (ex: those who consistently share, and those who simply consume 
information) in regard to sharing deceptive information may be worth exploring in future 
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research. As mentioned before, the level of knowledge and comfort in a topic presented 
may have affected whether or not people chose to share information as well.  
The study also did not consider the time spent understanding information, 
deceptive or truthful, that each individual would potentially devote either within or 
outside of this study. After all, the time people choose to spend understanding the 
information they consume, as well as their overall willingness to dig deeper, may also 
play a large role in whether they choose to share the information.  
Future Direction 
For future research, the relationship between susceptibility to deception, 
confirmation bias, and information shared should be further evaluated to understand the 
level at which these cognitive mechanisms truly affect how people behave. For 
improvements to this study, it is suggested that a more direct measure of susceptibility to 
deception be taken and other factors in conjunction with confirmation bias and 
susceptibility to deception be considered, among other changes discussed previously.  
Research has shown that people will share within an environment that they 
perceive to be open and fair. Comparing these findings to the reasons people shared in 
this study loosely suggests that people may typically share information from their family 
or friends because they perceive them as open, fair, and potentially trustworthy. The 
relationship between the information presented and the source of that information should 
be explored to further understand the role trust and credibility of source play when people 
choose to share information on social media.  
This study represents a step forward in research toward understanding sharing 
behavior in online environments. As past research has provided knowledge about 
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persistent cognitive models, behavior, and biases, these things should be studied within 
the changing environments of communication and interaction. As social media and other 
online interaction becomes an increasingly common medium for communication, it 
remains even more important that research keeps up with these changes to understand 
how the interactions are affected, and what opportunities they create for both good and 
malicious communication.  
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APPENDIX A 
BATTLESHIP PLAYING RULES 
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At the beginning of each game, each player will set up his/her battleship board, placing 
ships where desired. The game is played in rounds, where each player is allowed 1 shot 
each round. 
 
Objective: Sink all of opponent’s ships. 
 
Rounds: Each round consists of one player calling 1 shot and the opponent confirming or 
denying the shot as hit/miss. The player who calls the shot then has the opportunity to 
call the opponent’s bluff. If the player correctly calls the opponent’s bluff, they are 
awarded an extra shot (the opponent loses their next shot). If the player incorrectly calls a 
bluff, then that player loses a shot. 
 
Caveats: 
Bluffs can only be called once the shot has been fired. 
Sunken ships must be truthfully acknowledged after final shot fired in the round, but 
before bluffs are called out. The end of the game (one player’s ships are all sunk) must 
also be truthfully acknowledged. 
Experimenter will call any ships that have been sunk at the end of each round, before any 
bluffs are called out. 
Players can make eye contact with each other, but are not required to. Players cannot see 
each other’s game board. 
Players can only deceive about hits/misses. 
 
Strategy: Players can keep track of misses and hits. 
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APPENDIX B 
CONTENT FOR SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS 
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Neutral Post Content 
True Content: 
• Plastic water bottles should not be reused without thorough cleansing, as they 
may harbor bacteria from your mouth (Chan, 2014) 
• Stretching before running may lower your endurance (Rettner, 2010) 
• Only female mosquitoes bite (Lawhorne, 2017)  
• Origami owl, a popular custom jewelry company, has been called a pyramid 
scheme, but is actually just a multi-level marketing company made up of 
independent designers that sell a legitimate product. (Origami Owl Custom 
Jewelry - Our Story, n.d.) 
• The World Wildlife Fund is working with Tiger beer, a company that sells beer, 
to support tiger conservation efforts for the endangered species. (Faggian, 2018)  
False Content: 
• Drinking water keeps your skin from becoming dry. (Gibson, 2015)  
• Running on a treadmill is better for your knees because it places less stress on 
your joints than running on pavement (Wallberg, 2016) 
• Pitbulls and Rottweilers have the same bite strength. (Position Statement on Pit 
Bulls, n.d.) 
• LuLaRoe is suffering a lawsuit of $1 billion for selling clothes with illegally used 
copyright patterns. (Donnelly, 2017) 
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• The American Strongmind Association has recently been added as a subsection to 
the American Red Cross to manage and facilitate relief efforts associated with 
disasters that occur as a result of mental health. (Community partners, n.d.) 
 
Controversial Post Content 
True Content: 
• The ownership of machine guns was prohibited in the United States back in 1986. 
(Kertscher, 2016) 
• More millennials households are in poverty than households headed by any other 
generation. (Fry, 2017) 
• Maternal mortality in Sweden is among the lowest in the world. (Health Care in 
Sweden, 2018) 
• Applications for citizenship experienced a 49% increase in approval from 2016, 
meaning more foreign immigrants were granted citizenship since 2016 (U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration services. Number of Form N-400, Application for 
Naturalization, by Category of Naturalization, Case Status, and USCIS Field 
Office Location [PDF File]) 
• The iPhone 4s was the first iPhone to support retina display. (Cohen, 2015) 
False Content: 
• Conceal Carry permit owners can choose in which states to carry their weapon 
(NRA-ILA, n.d.) 
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• The Baby Boomer population size and diversity exceeds that of millennials. (US 
Census Bureau, 2015) 
• The US Affordable Healthcare Act did not cover pre-existing conditions. (HHS 
Office, & Public Affairs, 2017) 
• DACA recipients cannot gain citizenship by serving in the army. (Robertson, 
2018) 
• Apple was the first major company to introduce wireless charging for mobile 
phones. (Android phones with wireless charging, 2018) 
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APPENDIX C 
POST-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Why did you decide to share the posts that you did? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
How often do you share on social media? 
1. Never 
2. Once every few months 
3. At least once a month 
4. Daily 
5. Multiple times in a day 
Please select the option that best reflects your opinion. 
1. Generally, do you agree or disagree with gun control policy as it stands today? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
2. Generally, do you agree or disagree that the millennial generation is generous, 
team-oriented, and collaborative? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
3. Generally, do you agree or disagree with healthcare as it stands in the US 
today? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
4. Generally, do you agree or disagree with the current immigration policies in 
US as they stand today? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
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5. Generally, do you agree or disagree with the overall, current advances in 
technology? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
6. Generally, do you agree or disagree with the minimum wage laws in the U.S. 
as they stand today? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
7. Generally, do you agree or disagree with laws surrounding abortion as they 
stand today? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
8. Generally, do you agree or disagree with the idea of increasing the use of 
nuclear power? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
9. Generally, do you agree or disagree with the U.S. intervening in world 
politics? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
10. Generally, do you agree or disagree with how cases of sexual assault are 
investigated in the U.S.? 
Strongly Agree | Agree | Somewhat Agree | Neutral | Somewhat Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
